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RECENT DECISIONS
seeable future, barring legislative activity. Therefore, it would seem
that the instant case pronounces a technically correct statement of
the applicable law. Although the dissent is in closer harmony with
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act, its acceptance as the governing rule
would necessitate a change in the existing statute 3 2 or in the sub-
stantive law of corporations.
CONTRACTS - JOINT VENTURES - ENFORCING LEGAL PART OF
AGREMENT.-Plaintiff, formerly sole proprietor of a New York
liquor business, entered upon a joint venture with defendants to sell
alcohol for industrial use and for beverage purposes in New York
and in international trade. Renewals of plaintiff's liquor license were
thereafter granted upon admittedly false statements that he was sole
owner of the business. In an action brought for an accounting, de-
fendants' motion to dismiss the complaint was granted because of the
resulting illegality 1 to that part of the business which encompassed
the selling of alcohol in New York. Held, reversed. Dismissal of
corporations involved were engaged in separate businesses and the claims at-
tempted to be voted did not arise out of a course of dealings between them
as in the Loewer's case.
32 Compare Section 44(a), supra note 17, with the standards of impartiality
set out elsewhere in the Act for a trustee in corporate reorganization. BANK-
Rurrc, Acr § 158(4), 52 STAT. 888 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 558(4) (1946), de-
clares that a person shall not be deemed disinterested for the purposes of
selection as a trustee in corporate reorganization if ". . . it appears that he
has, by reason of any other direct or indirect relationship to, connection with,
or interest in the debtor or such underwriter, or for any reason an interest
materially adverse to the interests of any class of creditors or stockholders."
(Emphasis supplied.) See also Consolidated Realty Co. v. Dyers, Finishers &
Bleachers Federation, 137 N. J. Eq. 413, 45 A. 2d 132 (Ch. 1946). The court
ruled that a corporation, owned and controlled by the same persons as another
corporation then involved in a labor dispute, was deemed to be an interested
party in said labor dispute despite the separate entities of both corporations.
The statute applicable (R. S. 2: 29-77.8 N. J. S. A.) read, "A person or asso-
ciation shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute
... if he or it is engaged in the industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which
such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein. . .
I N. Y. ALco. Bay. Co. LAw § 110. . .. [I]n any application for a license
under this chapter, the following information shall be given under oath:
1. The name . . . of each applicant and, if there be more than one and
they be partners, the partnership name ... of the several persons so applying.
2. The name.., of each person interested, or to become interested, in the
business covered by license for which application is made, together with the
nature of such interests. . . . N. Y. ALco. BEy. Co. LAW § 130. "Any person
who shall make any false statement in the application for a license or permit
under this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor..
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the complaint was unwarranted unless the legal part of the venture
was so interwoven with the illegal part that it would be impossible
to sever them. Rosenblum v. Frankel, 279 App. Div. 66, 108 N. Y. S.
2d 6 (1st Dep't 1951).
Courts have generally refused to affirmatively enforce an illegal
contract or to aid one guilty party to the contract against the other.2
This broad rule has given way to two major exceptions: (1) where
the plaintiff is not in pari delicto with the defendant, and (2) where
the plaintiff repents before the contract is fully executed and seeks to
rescind.4 Another recognized exception is made, however, where the
parties enter into a contract in violation of a statute with full know-
ledge of the illegality of the transaction. One party may there avail
himself of judicial aid if he can show himself to be a member of the
class meant to be protected by the statute.5 Thus, a borrower of
money at a usurious rate may recover excessive interest paid, since
the usury laws were intended to penalize the reprehensible money
lender and not the needy borrower. 6
Similarly, where the denial of a remedy will effectuate the very
evil the statute was intended to prevent, another modification results.
Hence, where a bank loaned money to one of its directors in viola-
tion of a statute prohibiting such loans, the bank was allowed to re-
cover the money, since the very purpose of the statute was to prevent
the impairment of depositors' funds.7
Illegal ventures present a novel problem. Will a court compel
an accounting of the fruits of an illegal enterprise? It has been said
that a suit for an accounting is essentially based on a new implied
contract to divide profits and is thus not tainted with the illegality
of the original undertaking. It is asserted that it would be inequi-
table to allow one joint venturer to keep all of the profits, though the
underlying agreement be illegal.8 This view was questioned at an
early date by Sir George Jessel in the oft cited case of Sykes v.
Beadon.9
2 Veazey v. Allen, 173 N. Y. 359, 66 N. E. 103 (1903); Attridge v. Pem-
broke, 235 App. Div. 101, 256 N. Y. Supp. 257 (4th Dep't 1932) ; Coverly v.
Terminal Warehouse Co., 85 App. Div. 488, 83 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't
1903).
3 Rogers v. Samples, 207 Ky. 150, 268 S. W. 799 (1925) ; Tracy v. Tal-
madge, 14 N. Y. 162 (1856); Budd v. Morning Telegraph, Inc., 241 App. Div.
142, 271 N. Y. Supp. 538 (1st Dep't), aff'd iner., 265 N. Y. 639, 193 N. E.
430 (1934) ; Barna v. Clifford Country Estates, Inc., 143 Misc. 813, 258 N. Y.
Supp. 671 (N. Y. City Ct. 1932).
4 Spring Co. v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49 (1880).
5 Fergus County v. Osweiler, 107 Mont. 466, 86 P. 2d 410 (1938).
6 Smith v. Bryant, 209 N. C. 213, 183 S. E. 276 (1936) ; Taylor v. Budd,
217 Cal. 262, 18 P. 2d 333 (1933).
7 Lester v. Howard Bank, 33 Md. 558 (1871).8 Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70, 84 (U. S. 1864); Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Ph.
801, 41 Eng. Rep. 1153 (1849).
911 Ch. D. 170 (1879). Said the Master of the Rolls: "... [T]he prin-
ciple is clear that you cannot directly enforce an illegal contract, and you can-
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The view that an accounting action is free from the illegality of
the original venture was expressly rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in McMullen v. Hoffman,10 where it was held that a
plaintiff should not be entitled to relief if the illegal agreement must
be pleaded as a basis of recovery. However, if the plaintiff can assert
a claim based on a new and independent contract such as an agree-
ment contemplating the reinvestment of the illegally obtained funds,"
or a promissory note given to the plaintiff in consideration of his
share of the proceeds, 12 he may be entitled to relief for, in such cases,
the illegal contract is not before the court.--
The plaintiff has been granted relief where the contract is sev-
erable; that is, where the legal part may be effectively separated from
the illegal. The Restatement rule exemplifies the severability doc-
trine. It proposes that where any part of a bilateral agreement is
illegal, no legal promise therein can be enforced unless a separate
legal consideration is apportioned therefor. 14 Separate consideration,
in one form or another, was prerequisite to recovery in New York
before the Restatement. In Foley v. Speir,15 the agreement pleaded
was founded in part upon a consideration which contemplated cer-
tain acts in violation of an election law. The Court of Appeals, in
holding that the whole agreement was tainted with illegality, said:
"Here is but one promise upon a consideration which is in part un-
lawful both by statute and against good morals." 16
A majority of the courts in the United States have denied re-
covery on facts analogous to those in the principal case,17 either fol-
lowing the view of the McMullen decision, or upon a finding that the
particular agreement in suit was not severable.'8 The contract in the
not ask the Court to assist you in carrying it out. You cannot enforce it in-
directly; that is, by claiming damages or compensation for the breach of it,
or contribution from the persons making the profits realized from it." Id. at
197.
10 174 U. S. 639, 668 (1898).
1" Johnson v. Davidson, 54 Cal. App. 251, 202 Pac. 159 (1921).
'
2 Brady v. Horvath, 167 Ill. 610, 47 N. E. 757 (1897).
13 Where the suit for accounting can be based only on the illegal agreement
itself, relief is denied. Carlisle v. Smith, 234 Fed. 759 (N. D. Ga. 1916)
(quantum meruit allowed, however); Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v.
Respass, 112 Ky. 606, 66 S. W. 421 (1902) (gambling); Snell v. Dwight, 120
Mass. 9 (1876) ; Dunham v. Presby, 120 Mass. 285 (1876) (trading with the
enemy); Morrison v. Bennett, 20 Mont. 560, 52 Pac. 553 (1898).
1 4R.PSTATEM,1ENT, CONTRACrs § 607 (1932).
'5 100 N. Y. 552, 3 N. E. 477 (1885) (the illegal part of the contract en-
compassed the procurement of voters at the polls) ; Parthey v. Beyer, 228 App.
Div. 308, 238 N. Y. Supp. 412 (2d Dep't 1930); Coffey v. Burke, 132 App.
Div. 128, 116 N. Y. Supp. 514 (2d DeD't 1909).
'1 Foley v. Speir, 100 N. Y. 552, 558, 3 N. E. 477, 479 (1885).
17 McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639 (189) ; Northrup v. Phillips. 99
Ill. 449 (1881) ; Dunham v. Presby, 120 Mass. 285 (1876) ; Morrison v. Ben-
nett, 20 Mont. 560, 52 Pac. 553 (1898) ; King v. Winants, 71 N. C. 410 (1874).
18 Shepp, v. Stevens, 177 Fed. 484 (N. D. N. Y. 1910); Foley v. Sper,
100 N. Y. 552, 3 N. E. 477 (1885).
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instant case would be unenforceable under the McMullen decision be-
cause of the necessity of pleading the illegal contract. Nor does the
severability rule apply, since there was no separate consideration
shown to be apportioned for the legal part of the venture.
There is persuasive authority in New York for denying an ac-
counting to a partner in an illegal venture. In Leonard v. Poole,19 a
number of firms agreed to advance the price of lard, in violation of
the penal law. An, action for an accounting was brought against a
broker who had participated in the scheme as an agent only. The
court, treating all parties to the illegal agreement as principals20 held
that an action would not lie against the broker.
The underlying purpose of denying enforcement of illegal agree-
ments, not always expressed in the decisions, is the discouragement of
their formation.21 It is submitted that a decision in conformity with
the rule in the McMullen case would more adequately serve this
purpose than does the ruling in the instant case.
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - ILLEGALLY SECURED
EVIDENCE.-Antonio Rochin was convicted in the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County on a charge of possessing narcotics.' Three
deputy sheriffs, without either a warrant of arrest or search warrant,
forced their way into petitioner's bedroom. As they entered, peti-
tioner swallowed two capsules that were lying on a table next to the
bed. The sheriffs forcibly attempted to extract these capsules from
petitioner's mouth. This effort proving futile, they then removed
him to a nearby hospital, where the capsules were recovered by forc-
ing a rubber tube down his throat and pouring an emetic solution
down this tube. The capsules thus obtained were found to contain
morphine and were the chief evidence used against him on the trial.
Held, conviction reversed. The methods employed to elicit evidence
in this case were so brutal and offensive to human dignity as to render
the evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Rochin v.
People of California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952).
19 114 N. Y. 371, 21 N. E. 707 (1889).
2 0 Id. at 378, 21 N. E. at 709.
21 5 WLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 1630 (Rev. ed. 1937); see Attridge v. Pem-
broke, 235 App. Div. 101, 102, 256 N. Y. Supp. 257, 258 (4th Dep't 1932);
Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 124 App. Div. 384, 389, 108 N. Y. Supp. 830,
834 (1st Dep't 1908).
1 A petition for a rehearing wras denied. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App.
2d 140, 225 P. 2d 1 (1950), hearing denied, 225 P. 2d 913 (Cal. 1951).
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